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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Benjamin Weintraub* and Alan N. Resnick**

THE SECURED CREDITOR'S
RIGHTS TO COMMINGLED
CASH PROCEEDS UPON
THE DEBTOR'S BANKRUPTCY

identifiable proceeds derived from
the collateral. 2

A secured creditor ordinarily has
an interest in cash and noncash proceeds of the collatera1. 1 Commingling of funds in the debtor's general
deposit account of cash proceeds of
goods held for resale, however, may
present difficult problems of recovery
for the creditor with a security interest in inventory in the event that
bankruptcy ensues.
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the secured
creditor's rights to cash proceeds
usually depended on the ability to
trace . all or part of commingled
funds directly to the sale of the collateral. In essence, the secured creditor's rights to a general deposit account was limited to the extent that
the balance of the account contained

* Counsel to the law firm of Levin
& Weintraub, New York City; member

of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
* * Associate Dean and Professor of
Law, Hofstra University School of Law,
Hempstead, New York.
They are also co-authors of Bankruptcy Law Manual, published by Warren, Gorham & Lamont.
1 See U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This article is based on the Official Text of the
UCC as amended as of 1972. "Cash
proceeds" is defined to include checks
and deposit accounts as well as money.
u .c.c. § 9-306 (1).

Section 9-306(4)(d)-A Limited
Right to Proceeds
The process of tracing commingled funds was so difficult, if not
impossible, in insolvency cases, that
the drafters of the UCC attempted
to avoid its necessity. Section 9-306
(4)(d), which represents a significant
departure from pre-UCC rules, provides that in the event of an insolvency proceeding the secured creditor has a perfected security interest
in all cash and deposit accounts of
the debtor in which proceeds have
been commingled with other funds.
This right is limited, however, to an
amount not greater than the amount
of any cash proceeds received by the
debtor within ten days before the
institution of the insolvency case.
This amount is to be reduced by (1)
any cash proceeds received by the
debtor and paid to the secured party
during the ten-day period, (2) any
identifiable cash proceeds received
during the ten-day period and contained in a separate noncommingled
account, ( 3) identifiable cash proceeds in the form of money received
during the ten-day period which are
not commingled or deposited in an
2 See In re C.B. Pontz & Son, Inc.,
2 U.C.C. 1120, 1128 (B.D. Pa.), af]'d
11 U.C.C. 1131 (B.D. Pa. 1965), af}'d
mem. 359 F.2d 436 (3d Cir. 1966);
White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code 1011-1012 (2d ed. 1980).
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account, and ( 4) identifiable checks
received during the ten-day period
which are not deposited. Additionally, the secured creditor's rights in
these funds are subject to diminution
by any right of setoff which the bank
has against the debtor. 3
The Ten-Day Rule
It is important to note at the outset that Section 9-306(4)(d) deprives the secured party of the
right to trace identifiable proceeds
which were deposited in the debtor's
general account more than ten days
prior to bankruptcy. "The idea evidently is that the right to trace [cash
proceeds received prior to the tenday period] does not survive unless
the debtor has ,~een required to
segregate the cash proceeds from his
other cash assets." 4 An illustration
of this rule is the recent case of
In re Cooper.5 The debtor made a
deposit of $34,356 in a general account on September 7, 1976 and
filed a Chapter XI petition on September 26 of the same year. A secured creditor claimed that the September 7 deposit constituted cash
proceeds of its collateral and wanted
the opportunity to establish that the
balance of the account on the date
of bankruptcy could be identified as
such proceeds despite the commingling of other funds in the account.
The court held, however, that Section 9-306( 4 )(d) deprives the se3 U.C.C. § 9-306(4)(d)(i).
Since
setoffs are recognized by Section 553
of the Bankruptcy Code, a bank having a deposit of such commingled
funds may have a right of setoff which
would be superior to the rights of the
secured creditor.
4 2 Gilmore, Security Interests in
Personal Property 1338 (1965).
52 B.R. 188 (S.D. Tex., 1980).

cured creditor of the pre-UCC right
to trace proceeds in a general account unless such proceeds were received within ten days prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy
case. Since the deposit was made
more than ten days before bankruptcy, the secured creditor has no
rights in the account.
Ambiguities in Section 9-306(4)(d)
The secured creditor's rights in the
debtor's general account with respect
to proceeds received within ten days
prior to bankruptcy are governed by
Section 9-306(4) (d). Ambiguity in
that section makes possible three
different interpretations. 6 To illustrate, assume that within ten days
prior to bankruptcy a debtor receives $10,000 as proceeds of inventory in which the inventory financer has a perfected security interest. The debtor deposits $2,000
of such proceeds into the general deposit account and spends the remaining $8,000. On the date of bankruptcy, the balance of the account
is $15,000, which also includes proceeds received upon the sale of collateral of other secured creditors.
According to Section 9-306(4)(d),
the inventory financer is entitled to
the deposit account "limited to an
amount not greater than the amount
of any cash proceeds received by the
debtor within ten days" prior to
bankruptcy. Does "any cash proceeds received by the debtor" within
such ten-day period mean ( 1) the
cash proceeds from the inventory
financer's collateral which is deposited in the account ($2,000), (2)
all cash proceeds from the inventory
financer's collateral, whether or not
6 See White & Summers, note 2
supra, at 1014.
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deposited in the account ($10,000),
or ( 3) all cash proceeds received
from collateral of all creditors within the ten-day period ($15,000)?
Professor Gilmore, chief draftsman of Article 9, is of the opinion
that the secured creditor is entitled
to the balance of the general account
in which his proceeds were commingled to the extent of the amount of
proceeds received from his collateral
within the ten-day period, whether
or not deposited in the account.1 If
faced with the above hypothetical,
Professor Gilmore would give the
inventory financer the right to take
$10,000 from the general account.
This interpretation undoubtedly is
based upon the UCC drafters' intention to eliminate the need for tracing proceeds in bank accounts containing commingled funds and a
compromise for the elimination of
the secured creditor's common-law
rights in commingled but traceable
cash proceeds received prior to the
ten-day period.
Unfortunately for secured creditors, courts have not carried out
Professor Gilmore's intention regarding Section 9-306(4)(d). Although
the rationale is not always the same,
courts have been consistent in depriving the secured creditor of the
right to take general deposit accounts
except to the extent that the secured
creditor is able to trace identifiable
proceeds derived from his collateral
and deposited within ten days prior
to bankruptcy.

courts is found in a 1976 court of
appeals case. In In re Gibson Products of Arizona, 8 a secured creditor
sold electrical appliances to the debtor and retained a perfected security
interest in such goods. Within the
ten-day period prior to the filing of
a Chapter XI petition, the debtor had
deposited $19,505 in its general bank
account derived from the sale of inventory, although only $10 of that
amount was derived from the sale
of the secured party's appliances.
Under Section 9-306(4) (d), thesecured creditor asserted a right to
receive the entire $19,505 balance
of the account to pay part of its
$28,800 claim. The trustee argued
that the secured creditor's right to
the balance of the account was limited to cash proceeds received from
the secured creditor's collateral only
and deposited in the account within
the ten-day period (i.e., $10).
The Ninth Circuit opinion recognized the broadest interpretation of
Section 9-306(4)(d) and agreed that
the section permits the secured creditor to take the proceeds of all inventory deposited in the account within
the ten-day period (i.e., $19,505).
"The intent was to eliminate the expense and nuisance of tracing when
funds are commingled and to limit
the grasp of secured creditors to the
amount received during the last ten
days before insolvency proceedings. . . ." 9 Nonetheless, the court
stated that to give the secured cred-

The Court's Application of Voidable
Preference Principles

8 543 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 430 U.S. 946 (1976). For further comment on this case, see Comment, "In re Gibson Products: Commingled Proceeds, The Uniform Commercial Code, and the Bankruptcy
Act," 125 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1379 (1977).
9 In re Gibson Prods. of Ariz., note
8 supra, at 655.

An illustration of how Section 9306(4)(d) has been applied by the
7 2 Gilmore, note 4 supra, at 1339;
See White & Summers, note 2 supra, at
1014.
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itor an interest in the $19,505 balance in effect could authorize a
preference under Section 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act; the secured creditor
was undersecured and allowing it to
take funds which are not proceeds of
its own collateral would permit the
preferential payment of an antecedent debt. The secured creditor
"only loses his claim to the amounts
in excess of his proceeds because
only that amount is a preference." 10
Judge Hufstedler, writing for the
court in remanding the case for further proceedings, stated: "To the extent that a creditor is able to identify
his proceeds to trace their path into
the commingled funds, he will be
able to defeat pro tanto the trustee's
assertion of a preference." 11
Following this line of thought, the
court held that although a secured
creditor's interest in the whole
amount is prima facie valid, that as
to a bankruptcy trustee, it is presumptively preferential. This means
that the secured creditor must rebut
this presumption by tracing the proceeds. The court in balancing the
equities put this burden on the secured creditor as being the party
that is in a better position to trace
its proceeds.
The application of voidable preference principles to require secured
creditors to trace cash proceeds deposited within ten days of bankruptcy
in the debtor's general account from
the sale of their collateral has also
been used by the Seventh Circuit
in Fitzpatrick v. Philco Finance
Corp.,1 2 a case which was cited in
the Gibson case, 1 3 and, most recent1o ld. at 657.
ll[d.

491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974).
Although both Fitzpatrick and
Gibson employed preference principles
12
13

ly, by a Rhode Island Bankruptcy
Court In re Dexter Buick-GMC
Truck Co.14 In the Dexter Buick
case the secured creditor had the
burden of tracing the cash proceeds
into the corporate checking account,
the production of evidence consisting
of cash receipt journals, car sale invoices, and bank statements of deposits at the debtor's bank.
Although all of these cases were
decided under the voidable preference provisions of the former Bankruptcy Act, there is no reason to
think that cases posing the same
issue will not have the same result
when the secured creditor collides
with the preference section of the
new Bankruptcy Code.lll
A Different Theory, Similar Result
A departure from the foregoing
case law in theory, but not result,
occurred in the recent case of In re
Guaranteed Muffler Supply Co.,
Inc.l6 The bankruptcy judge took
the position that the Gibson court
could have avoided the use of preference principles to limit the secured
creditor's rights to traceable proceeds
if it had interpreted Section 9-306
(4) (d) correctly. Citing Section 9306(2), which contains the general
rule that a security interest "continues in any identifiable proceeds"
of collateral, the court reasoned that
the secured creditor may assert a
lien on proceeds only "upon a showand achieved the same results, they
differed in the interpretation of Section
9-306(4)(d). See Note, "Bankruptcy
Proceeds Section: Recent. Interpretations of Section 9-306(4)(d) of the
Uniform Commercial Code," 55 Tex.
L. Rev. 891-897 (1977).
14 2 B.R. 242 (D.R.I. 1980).
15 11 u.s.c. § 547.
16 5 B.R. 236 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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ing that the property claimed is identified as the fruit of a sale or other
disposition of the original collateral." 17 Thus, limitations upon cash
proceeds under Section 9-306 ( 4) (d)
"include, by definition, the identifiability limitations which apply to all
claims made to all proceeds." 18
The necessity for tracing funds
received and deposited within the
ten-day period receives even greater
importance in view of Section 363
(c) (2) of the Bankruptcy Code,
which prohibits the use of cash collateral by the debtor except upon
notice to the secured creditor and
a hearing or upon the secured creditor's consent. An unreported case
pending under the Bankruptcy Code,
In re Allbrand Appliance & T.V. Co.,
lnc.,l 9 provides an illustration of the
problem. The debtor had on deposit
in its general account at the commencement of a Chapter XI case
proceeds resulting from sales within
the ten-day period of inventory purchased by the debtor from six different vendors subject to security agreements, as well as proceeds from merchandise free from liens. The necessity of utilizing the cash for immediate current operations caused the
debtor in possession to assume the
burden of identifying and segregating the proceeds belonging to each
secured creditor, as well as its own
merchandise, so as to have the availability of the free cash. This procedure was facilitated by the fact
that no disbursements had been made
from the account during the ten-day
period. Had such disbursements been
made, it would have been impossible

17
18

ld. at 238.
ld. at 238-239.

Dkt. No. 80-B-11736 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
19

to determine whose proceeds had
been disbursed.
Lessons to Be Learned

In sum, the judicial application of
Section 9-306(4) (d) and voidable
preference principles have serious
adverse consequences for secured
creditors regarding commingled cash
proceeds. Section 9-306(4)(d) has
the effect of wiping out the secured
creditor's rights in commingled proceeds deposited prior to the ten-day
period prior to bankruptcy, whether
or not such proceeds may be identified by tracing. Moreover, despite
the intended purpose of Section 9306(4) (d) as expressed by its chief
draftsman, the secured party will lose
rights in proceeds received and deposited in a general account within
the ten-day period to the extent that
the secured party is unable to sufficiently trace such proceeds to the
sale of its own collateral.
Finally, there is another section
of the Bankruptcy Code which may
provide an additional collision for
the secured creditor claiming an interest in cash proceeds. Section 552
(b) provides that a valid security
interest which is not vulnerable under
the trustee's avoiding powers extends
to secured goods in the trustee's possession and their proceeds acquired
after the commencement of the bankruptcy cases. 20 However, the secured
creditor's rights to the proceeds are
not greater than otherwise permitted
by the security agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. Although
the Bankruptcy Code requires the
trustee or debtor in possession to

20 11 U.S.C. § 552(b). See Weintrub & Resnick, Bankruptcy Law Manual § 5.11[5] (1980).
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"segregate and account for any cash
collateral" in his possession, custody,
or control, 21 the secured creditor
who expects post-petition cash proceeds from collateral should make
sure that such proceeds are actually
segregated.
Another limitation on the secured
creditor's right to receive post-petition proceeds under Section 552(b)
is based on the equities of the particular case. The right to such proceeds does not apply "to the extent
that the court, after notice and a
hearing and based on the equities of
the case, orders otherwise." As indicated in The Congressional Record,
"the court may evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to proceeds and any related improvement

2111

U.S.C. §§ 363(c) (4), 1107(a).

in position of the secured party." 22
When a debtor sells goods for the
retail price, he often incurs expenses
such as disbursements to personnel,
rent incurred in maintenance of the
goods, advertising expenses, and the
like. The payment of such expenses
by the estate would prejudice the
rights of unsecured creditors while
improving the position of the secured
creditor who receives the retail price
as proceeds of the collateral. It
would not be surprising, therefore, ·if
bankruptcy courts find that the secured creditor's interest in cash proceeds received after the commencement of the bankruptcy case is limited to the wholesale price instead
of the retail price.
22 124 Cong. Rec. H.11097, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in 17
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: A
Legislative History (Document 58)
(Resnick & Wypyski, 1979).

GOVERNMENT LOAN
"You knew it all along? A new book, 'Something for
Nothing,' reports that some government offices give out free
manure."
-The Wall Street Journal
December 5, 1980
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